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1. Introduction Baye et alii (1993) demonstrate the following somewhat surprising result, the so-called Exclusion
Principle. In an all-pay auction with complete information it might be in the best interest of the seller, if she is able to, to exclude some potential bidders from the short list of the auction participants. And in this case she should exclude those with the largest private valuations ("willingness to pay") for the (unique) object to be sold. The result can be applied to several social games, such as patent races and sports, and notably to lobbying games: see e.g Hillman and Riley (1989) . 1 It is due to the fact that the revenue expected (the bidding equilibrium is in mixed strategies) by the seller is decreasing in the largest valuation among bidders, call it v 1 , while increasing with respect to the second-largest valuation, v 2 (the other bidders bid zero with probability 1). Excluding the "strongest" bidders induces (some of) the "weakest" ones to bid more and may increase the overall expenditure. In particular, it turns out that the expected total payment to the seller is p(v 1 , v 2 ) = v 2 /2 + (v 2 /v 1 )(v 2 /2) < v 2 , where the latter amounts are the expected payments of bidders 1 and 2 (those with the largest and the second largest valuations) 2 respectively.
The object is assigned to bidders 1 and 2 respectively with probabilities 1 -v 2 /v 1 and v 2 /v 1 , and the former bidder expects v 1 -v 2 in the equilibrium (all the other bidders expect zero). The overall expected welfare is then
, and thus the outcome does not belong to the Core of the corresponding exchange game.
As indicated above, the quoted literature refers to the case of complete information, 3 which is a somewhat unusual assumption in auction theory. Moreover, the role and the information available to the designer (if any) of the auction are somehow left unexplained. In a companion paper (Bertoletti, 2005) , we argue for example that the Exclusion Principle is affected by the implicit assumption that the auction "reserve price" is null. 4 Indeed, as far as the lobbying models are concerned, the only consistent justification for the adopted setting seems to be that the politician (the seller) who receives the lobbies' (bidders') contributions has very little bargaining power.
However, the assumption that a fully informed seller can credibly exclude some bidder from her short list while she is unable to ask him a price not higher than his valuation does not appear generally palatable as a bargaining feature. More robust results should then be based on the explicit assumption that the seller does not know the bidders' preferences.
However, Menicucci (2005) strikingly shows that for some information structures the Exclusion Principle also applies to the case in which the seller regards the bidders' private valuations as identically and independently distributed (iid) and uses no reserve price. Namely, for the distributional structures that he considers, excluding from the all-pay auction with complete information among the bidders all but two of them (randomly selected) increases the seller's revenue. Menicucci's example uses a discrete distribution with "small" (the seller is almost certain about the bidders' valuations) uncertainty. In this note we show that the Exclusion Principle does not apply to the class of iid continuous distributions with a monotonic hazard rate (somewhat more generally, we show that for the Exclusion Principle to apply the distribution of valuations must be such that the conditional expected value of the difference between the highest and the secondhighest order statistics is somewhere increasing with respect to the value of the second-highest order statistics).
The setting and the result
Consider the following setting: m (risk-neutral) agents will possibly bid for a unique prize in Proof. Since the density function of the joint distribution of the first and second order 5 These are, of course, the assumptions of the well-known Revenue Equivalence Theorem: see e.g. Klemperer (2004: p. 17 ).
statistics (see e.g. Krishna, 2002: p. 267 ) is given by:
(where h(·) is the density function which corresponds to H(·) and I (⋅) (·) is the appropriate indicator function), the density function of v 1 conditional on v 2 is given by:
v 2 )}}, with obvious notation for the previous expectations. Now compute the derivative of:
with respect to v 2 : 
. (4) Then, by noting that p(⋅) is a convex function: 
increasing function of v 2 if the hazard rate is monotonic. Finally, recall that the (unconditional) distribution function of v 2 , given n symmetric participants to the auction, is:
Since 0 )
it follows that H 2 n first-order stochastically dominates H 2 n-1 , and thus that any exclusion from the set of the potential bidders (strictly) decreases the expected revenue of the seller if the hazard rate of H(⋅) is monotonic. QED
Conclusion
The intuition for the previous result is straightforward: the key is the sign of the following derivative:
The expected value of the difference of the first and the second order statistics of the participants'
valuations would change with the number of bidders according to the sign of (8) Note that the expected welfare is given by E{w(v 1 , v 2 )} = E{p(v 1 , v 2 )} + E{v 1 -v 2 }. So any bidder exclusion profitable for the seller would then raise the expected welfare by a trivial revealedpreference argument if it were also to increase E{v 1 -v 2 }. But this can never be the case if the hazard rate is monotonic, and the impact on the expected welfare of increasing the number of bidders' set remains ambiguous even in such a case. However, it is easy to see that a sufficient condition for an expected welfare improvement to follow any bidder addition under a monotonic hazard rate is 6 vh(v) > 1 (E{w(v 1 , v 2 )} increases with respect to the number of bidders if 
